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RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAIVER
dant in the exercise of a right, which by inference, the defendant in
Grey did not have. It is in this sense that failure to warn of an
indigent's right to appointed counsel, when the officers do not know
the financial status of a suspect, is not as effective as giving the
warning. Whether the defendant is prejudiced or not is unimpor-
tant as the clear holding of Miranda is that the fourfold warning
or an equally effective procedure is an absolute prerequisite to the
admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation."
In Grey, the court also held it was relevant to the federal con-
stitutional standard that the confession was made voluntarily. It is
clear, however, that under Miranda, voluntariness is not at issue.r0
As to voluntariness under state evidentiary standards, the court
seems to be indicating that in addition to Miranda requirements,
state standards impose the requirement of voluntariness. This is
consistent with the principle that federal constitutional guarantees
establish only minimum protective standards, which the states are
free to enlarge, but not diminish.
SAMUEL HOLLINGSWORTH, JR.
Constitutional Law-Waiver of Right to Counsel
An accused may waive his right to counsel, guaranteed to him
by the sixth amendment.' The courts, however, have been charged
with a protective duty to assure that such waiver is "intelligent and
competent."' As an accused's right to counsel has now been ex-
tended to state criminal proceedings, 3 the problem of waiver may
well become very important.
"Id. at 479.
"o See note 3 supra.
1 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall .. .have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "If the defendant
appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to
counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding
unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
FED. R. CRIm. P. 44. "[T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a
defendant. He may waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel
if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."
Adams v. United States ex. rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
2ohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
' See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), extending the right of counsel to any suspect
whose freedom has been curtailed "in any significant way." Id. at 444.
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The issue in Butler v. Burke4 was whether a Wisconsin court
had fulfilled its protective duty and the defendant's waiver had been
"intelligent and competent." The trial court had informed Butler
that he was charged with enticing a child for criminal purposes and
that the maximum penalty for this offense was ten years imprison-
ment, but no reference was made to the possibility of commitment
as a deviate under the Wisconsin Sexual Psychopath Act.5 Butler,
who had been fined forty dollars three weeks previously for a simi-
lar act,' waived counsel and pleaded guilty. The court committed
him as a deviate needing rehabilitation under the Psychopath Act.
A writ of habeas corpus was denied by the district courf and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.' The majority
ruled that Butler had intelligently waived his rights because there
had been no misrepresentation with regard to the maximum length
of detention. Petitioner could not complain that his commitment
was rehabilitative rather than punitive as long as the period of con-
finement was the same.' The court distinguished a case' ° in which
conviction was reversed because the period of commitment exceeded
the maximum sentence under the criminal charge, pointing out that
such was not the situation in this case.
In dissent, Circuit Judge Kiley pointed out that in light of
Butler's recent experience of a forty dollar fine for a related offense,
unless he was advised of the possibility of commitment as a sex
deviate he could not intelligently waive counsel. He cited a report
'360 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Wic 3116 (U.S.
Oct. 11, 1966). The sole issue in the district court was waiver at trial;
however, on appeal petitioner included allegations regarding waiver at pre-
liminary hearing and his plea of guilty. This note is directed only to the
first issue.
'Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 959.15(2) (1958) allows commitment under the
act if the court finds "that the defendant was probably directly motivated
by a desire for sexual excitement in the commission of the crime."
'Butler v. Burke, 250 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
7Id. at 183.
'Butler v. Burke, 360 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1966).
o Every person committed ... unless the department has . .. made
an order directing that he remain subject to its control for a longer
period and has applied to the committing court for a review of said
order ... shall be discharged at the expiration of the maximum term
prescribed by law for the offense for which he was convicted ....
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 959.15(12) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
The majority realized that Butler could be detained beyond ten years if
he was "still considered dangerous" but spoke as if the absolute maximum
term of commitment was ten years. 360 F.2d at 123.
" Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963).
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that indicated the success of attorneys in resisting civil commit-
ment of their clients" and referred to the standards established in
the leading cases with regard to waiver of counsel.
The Supreme Court first spoke definitively of waiver in Johnson
v. Zerbst'2 when it stated:
The determination of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of right to Counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, includ-
ing the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. 13
The Court went on to point out that the trial court has a "pro-
tecting duty [that] imposes the serious and weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent
and competent waiver by the accused." 4 The dearest delineation
of this duty to assure an intelligent waiver came ten years later in
Von MoItke v. Gillies :15
The fact that an accused may tell him [the judge] that he is
informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right
does not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be
valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the
nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them,
the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses
to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all
other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole mat-
ter.16
Recent cases rely on the standards in either or both of these
decisions when resolving or reviewing whether an accused has intel-
ligently waived his right to counselY.1 These standards are equally
applicable to proceedings in state courts.'8
21360 F.2d at 125 n.3.
12304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 464.1
"Id. at 465.
15332 U.S. 708 (1948).
1 Id. at 724. (Emphasis added.)
' Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515-16(1962); Aiken v. United States, 296 F.2d 604, 606-07 (4th Cir. 1961).
"
8
"We have held the principles declared in Johnson v. Zerbst equally
applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in state criminal pro-
ceedings." Carnley v. Cochran, supra note 17, at 515. The opinion goes on
to distinguish two cases that might have indicated a contrary conclusion.
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "Where rights secured
by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legisla-
tion which would abrogate them." Id. at 491.
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Butler was not advised of the possibility of commitment as a
sex deviate. Failure to advise a defendant of the possibility of
confinement under a rehabilitative law has recently been held, by a
district court, to nullify waiver of counsel. 9 Butler's past experi-
ence had been a small fine. Without knowledge of possible confine-
ment as a deviate he, "understandably, was under a misapprehension
as to what faced him."2 °
In the last decade historic Supreme Court decisions have changed
the complexion of criminal procedure. In the most recerit of these
landmark decisions, Miranda v. Arizona,2 the Court requires that
a suspect be advised of his right to counsel and against self incrimi-
nation, but it recognizes that the suspect may waive these rights
"provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intel-
ligently."22 The burden of proving such waiver with regard to pre-
trial interrogation is placed upon the prosecution.' Miranda indi-
cates that this burden will be met by showing, in the absence of any
coercion, that a suspect was clearly advised of these rights.24
The right to counsel at trial and before arraignment now ap-
plies to both state and federal criminal proceedings. The court itself
must protect this right at trial.' Thus it is now charged with the
dual duty of reviewing any alleged waiver of counsel in pre-trial
procedures following the standards enunciated in Miranda and of
ascertaining that any waiver upon trial meets the standards pre-
scribed in Johnson and Von Moltke. Because Von Moltke estab-
lishes a more specific standard than Johnson, a clarification of the
court's protective duty appears to be in order.
The court must assure itself that a defendant's waiver has been
intelligent. As the Supreme Court has suggested, "the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused" must be taken into account
"o Williams v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 382, 384 (E.D. Ky. 1964).
20 360 F.2d at 126 (dissent).1384 U.S. 436 (1966); see 45 N.C.L. Rzv. 206 (1966).
22 384 U.S. at 444.
28 "But unless and until such warning and waiver are demonstrated by
the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him [the accused]." Id. at 479. Note that violation
of pre-trial rights affects the admissibility of evidence, whereas denial of
the right to counsel upon trial results in vacating any conviction obtained.
", Miranda would not seem to require more than this. The police "must
make known to him [the suspect] that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if
he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any in-
terrogation." Id. at 474.
25 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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by the trial judge.26 Thus a technical explanation may well fulfill
the court's duty to a well-educated defendant; while to an unedu-
cated defendant a simple, clear explanation in easily understand-
able terms would seem desirable. The accused should have a broad
understanding of the matter. This could require advising an accused
that an attorney might be able to present a defense for him. Argu-
ably, though, the judge himself should not advise of any defenses
as this would pre-empt the function of the lawyer to whom the
defendant has a right.2 As a minimum in all cases, three of the
criteria stated in Von Moltke would appear necessary to assure a
voluntary waiver of counsel: apprehension of (1) the nature of the
charges, (2) the statutory offenses included within the charges, and
(3) the range 8 of allowable punishments for these offenses. 9
Regardless of any possible clarification that may be forthcoming
with regard to the doctrine of intelligent waiver, it appears that the
dissenting opinion in Butler, by applying the circumstances of the
case to the standards set out in both Johnson and Von Moltke,
reaches the correct conclusion.
GEORGE CARSON II
Contracts-Employment-Remedies For Wrongful Breach
In 1966 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-examined its
prior decisions concerning the remedies available to an employee
who has been wrongfully discharged during the term of his con-
tract. In so doing it took a significant step toward realigning itself
"
8 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
7 Two circuits have reached this conclusion since the requirement of
advice concerning defenses was first set out in Von Moltke. In United States
v. McGee, 242 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 17 (1957), the
court reasoned: "The innumerable factual situations that might possibly
afford an accused a defense to the crime charged reveals the absurdity of
the assertion that to be valid the waiver of counsel . . . may be accepted
only after the trial judge had made known to the accused every conceivable
defense that may be available . . . ." Id. at 524. In Michener v. United
States, 181 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1950) the court declares: "Nor is it the duty
of the trial court judge to explain and set out for an accused the possible
defenses he might adduce to the charges against him .... [I]t is not the
duty or the responsibility of the trial judge to give legal advice to an
accused, or to any party . . . ." Id. at 918.
" WEBSTER, NNv COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY (1960), defines range as:
"The limits of a series of actual or possible variations; as, a range of
choice."29 332 U.S. at 724.
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